Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
finnandClaude Opus 5.5 dc85c578a2 Protect against login CSRF without cookies for anonymous users
Anonymous users must not get cookies or session store entries, so a
CSRF token for /login is not possible. Instead, every unsafe request is
checked statelessly via Sec-Fetch-Site, falling back to Origin. Requests
without both headers are not from a browser and are accepted. The
expected origin comes from the new MAX_ORIGIN setting, which is required
outside of debug mode.

Further CSRF changes:
- Do not delete the CSRF token on a failed check. It added no security,
  but invalidated forms in open tabs and could be triggered cross-site.
- Treat HEAD and OPTIONS as safe methods.

Keep the login page free of sessions:
- Show login messages via ?msg=login_required|logout (fixed keys only)
  and the login error via the template context instead of flash().
- Only send the session deletion cookie if the client sent a cookie.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-21 11:03:03 +00:00
finn 65dddea3bc initial switch to a devcontainer 2026-10-21 06:25:18 +00:00
finn 2bd853e9b5 modernizing the dependencies 2026-10-19 18:53:59 +02:00
Finn Stutzenstein add153d8a6 More work 2022-01-22 18:37:56 +01:00